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Abstract 
Annually the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) provides support to the farming sector 
amounting to more than EUR 50 billion in the EU, of which direct payments (DPs) take 
around 70%. DPs are often argued to be granted unfairly to large farms. In this paper 
we analyse implications and the political economy of DP capping in Slovakia in the context 
of the ongoing negations about the future CAP reform. The simulation results for Slovakia 
show that if the 2018 Commission proposal was approved it would lead to losses of EUR 
190.1 million (68% of total DPs) to large farms when labour costs are not subtracted. These 
losses would decrease to only EUR 12.2 million (4.4% of total DPs) when the labour costs 
are subtracted. Further, the results show that potentially affected large farms in Slovakia 
show lower performance and lower compliance with the agricultural policy objectives 
than farms unaffected by the DP capping. Similar to the past CAP reforms, the position 
of Slovakia against DP capping is expected to be maintained also in future, which could be 
explained by three main factors: the productivity argument, the political economy argument 
linked to the lobby pressure from large farms and low economic distortions caused by DPs.
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1. Introduction
Direct payment (DP) is the main support instrument used under the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) to support farming sector in the EU. Annually, CAP provides support 
amounting to more than EUR 50 billion and DPs represent around 70% of the total support 
(OJEU, 2018). The distribution of DPs between small a large farms is one of the most 
politically sensitive issue given that it is often argued that granting support to large farms 
is unnecessary given that these farms are able to generate suffi cient income, and it is often 
perceived that the support could be allocated instead to better purposes such as for rural 
development and provision of public goods. Naturally, the most concerned Member States 
(MS) are particularly those with a large share of large farms such as Slovakia, Czechia 
or Germany.
Attempts to address this politically contentious issue of DP distribution go back 
to the MacSharry reform of 1992. The 1992 MacSharry reform tried to reduce DPs for large 
farms gradually but the proposal did not pass in the Council. A reduction of 5% for all 
farms receiving more than EUR 5,000 was implemented in 2005 and it became known as 
modulation. As part of the 2008 Health Check, the Commission proposed additional cuts 
to DPs for large farms. However, the coalition of countries with large farms opposed it and 
only a small increase in modulation rates was agreed upon from 2009 onwards (EC, 2008; 
Swinnen, 2015; Matthews, 2018a).
Currently the most advocated instruments promoted to address the distribution of DPs 
are the reduction (degressivity) and capping of DPs to large farms (referred to as “capping”) 
and granting additional payments to small farms (referred to as “redistributive payment”). 
In the last CAP reform from 2013, the capping of DPs was a hotly debated policy issue and 
raised attention particularly in MS with large farms. These MS were the strongest opponents 
of policies that would reduce DPs to large farms. The fi nal agreement on the 2013 CAP 
reform allowed MS a relatively high fl exibility on application of capping and obligatory 
was made only a small reduction of DPs to large farms (EU, 2013). This implies that 
pressures from opposing MS were successful in diminishing the relevance of capping. 
In particular, they downplayed the original proposal of the European Commission 
presented in October 2011, which was more ambitious in the level of capping compared 
to the fi nal agreement (EC, 2011a).
Given the limited capping introduced by the 2013 CAP reform, the reduction of DPs 
to large farms still remains a contentious issue in the current debate about the new CAP 
for the fi nancial period 2021–2027. In its 2017 Communication, the Commission showed 
preference to maintain DPs within the new CAP. However, the Commission argued 
that the distribution of DPs among farms needs to be “fairer”. The proposed measures 
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to ensure a “fairer” distribution of payments to farmers include those already considered 
in the previous CAP reform: degressivity, capping, and redistributive payments. Compared 
to the 2011 Commission proposal for the previous CAP reform, the 2018 proposal has 
higher ambition to rebalance DPs between small and large farms (EC, 2018a).
In this paper, we analyse implications and the political economy of DP capping 
in Slovakia in the context of the ongoing discussions and negations about the future CAP 
reform for the period 2020–2027. More specifi cally, we analyse the implications of DP 
capping and other measures for limiting DPs to large farms such as their distributive 
payment or degressivity. We attempt to simulate the amount of DPs that is at stake under 
different scenarios of DP capping for large farms which were considered in the current 
discussion on the future CAP for the period 2021–2027. Further, we discuss political 
economy pressures explaining the political preferences for capping in Slovakia. Slovakia 
is an interesting example because it is dominated by large corporate farms rather than 
small family farms, which dominate the farm structure in most other MS (particularly 
in Old MS).
This paper contributes to the literature on agricultural subsidies and their income 
distributional effects. One of the most debated issues of agricultural subsidies disbursement 
– in both EU and non-EU countries – relates to the issue of who benefi ts from them. Studies 
have analysed both direct and market-induced income distributional effects of agricultural 
subsidies. The direct effects refer to the problem of the distribution of subsidies among 
benefi ciaries, how equally or unequally they are disbursed within the agricultural sector 
across farms, products and regions and how different reforms impact this distribution 
(e.g., Kirwan, 2007; MacDonald et al., 2006; Espinosa et al., 2020). Studies on market-
induced income distributional effects of subsidies consider changes in factor and output 
prices caused by subsidies and attempt to investigate to what extent the subsidies are 
benefi ted by farmers or whether they are leaked to non-agricultural sectors (e.g., to land-
owners, consumers, food processing sector) (e.g., Floyd, 1965; Gardner, 1987; Ciaian 
et al., 2018; Kirwan, 2009; Michalek et al., 2014). In the context of DPs granted under 
the CAP, studies have analysed the direct income distributional effects by analysing past 
CAP reforms covering either specifi c Member States or the whole EU (e.g., Cionga et al.,
2008; EC, 2011b; Espinosa et al., 2020). The literature on market-induced income 
distributional effects analyses in particular to what extent DPs are leaked to landowners 
(i.e., to what extent DPs are capitalised into land prices) (e.g., Ciaian et al., 2018; Ciaian 
and Swinnen, 2009; Kilian and Salhofer, 2008; Patton et al., 2008; Salhofer and Schmid, 
2004; Michalek et al., 2014; O’Neill and Hanrahan, 2016). This paper analyses the direct 
income distributional effects of DPs. Its main contribution to the literature is by focusing 
on the latest CAP reform and its comparison with different policy options (which is 
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analysed less in the literature) by covering specifi c measures targeting large benefi ciaries 
(big farms) (studies often combine different measures or cover the whole CAP reform 
package, e.g., EC, 2018b) and by using detailed farm-level data for commercial farms 
in Slovakia, which allows us to take into consideration all elements that affect the level 
and change of DPs to large farms (i.e., degressivity, capping, redistributive payment).
2. DP Redistribution Between Small and Large Farms: Snapshot 
from Recent CAP Reform Proposals
The primary instruments used within CAP to redistribute DPs between small and large 
farms include degressivity, capping, and redistributive payments. The degressivity and 
capping aim to reduce the decoupled payments for the largest farms. The redistributive 
payments aims to increase the support for small and medium-sized farms by granting 
a higher payment for the fi rst hectares. The redistributive payment is an additional payment 
to the fi rst hectares up to 30 hectares or up to the average farm size in the MS where this 
average is greater than 30 hectares.
Under the EU political procedure, fi rst the European Commission proposes legislation 
which then needs to be adopted by the Council and the European Parliament (Crombez and 
Swinnen, 2011). The 2011 initial proposal of the European Commission prepared for CAP 
for the fi nancial period 2014–2020 was relatively ambitious in its attempt to reduce DPs 
to large farms. It considered a reduction of DPs by 20% starting from a EUR 150,000 
threshold per farm and then progressively increasing the rate to 100% for payments above 
a EUR 300,000 threshold per farm, thus practically leading to a capping of payments 
(Table 1). The Commission proposal allowed subtracting labour costs in calculating these 
thresholds for DP reduction.
According to the European Commission estimations, the application of the proposal 
on degressivity and capping of DPs would have had heterogeneous impacts across MS 
(EC, 2011b). According to EC (2011b), the most affected MS in terms of the share of DP 
reduction to large farm as well as the percentage change of income of capped farms 
would be Bulgaria, Greece, Slovakia and Romania but also Czechia and Hungary, 
although with variation depending on the assumption on the labour costs deduction and 
the capping threshold. These are the countries with a signifi cant share of large farms. 
Germany would have also been affected by capping mainly because of the importance 
of large farms in Eastern part of the country. Thirteen MS would have not been affected 
at all by the Commission proposal because there is not a signifi cant share of large 
farms in these countries (and/or the labour costs bring the DPs below the threshold) 
(EC, 2011b).
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Table 1: Capping and degressivity in the 2011 and 2018 Commission 
proposals and 2013 CAP reform 










60,000–75,000 0 0 25
75,000–90,000 0 0 50
90,000–100,000 0 0 75
100,000–150,000 0 0 100
150,000–200,000 20 5 100
200,000–250,000 40 5 100
250,000–300,000 70 5 100
More than 300,000 100 5 100
Sources: EC (2011a); EU (2013); EC (2018a)
Given a relatively signifi cant share of DPs being potentially affected by the 2011 
Commission proposal, the Council and the European Parliament slashed down the mea- 
sure on capping within the fi nal agreement on the 2013 CAP reform. According to the agree- 
ment, MS are required to reduce DPs by at least 5% for payments above EUR 150,000 
per farm (Table 1). This is a radical softening from the initial Commission proposal 
which considered at least 20% cut in DPs. Further, the fi nal agreement gave fl exibility 
to MS in the application of degressivity, capping versus redistributive payments. MS are 
exempted from degressivity if they implement the redistributive payment accounting 
for more than 5% of the DPs.
In practice, most MS (19 MS) decided to apply DP reduction at the minimum re-
quired 5% rate or zero rate if applying redistributive payments. Eight MS have introduced 
redistributive payments. Only 9 MS have decided to introduce capping for DPs with 
most of them starting from the EUR 150,000 threshold per farm. As expected, MS with 
a signifi cant share of large farms (e.g., Czechia, Slovakia) apply only the minimum 5%
reduction rate of DPs required by the 2013 CAP reform. Interestingly, Czechia and 
Slovakia, two countries with the largest farms in the EU, opted not to introduce redis- 
tributive payments, which would benefi t smaller and medium farms at the expense of large 
farms (Table 2).
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Belgium WL/FL 30 115 17 150/150 100/5
Bulgaria 30 77 7 150/300 5/100
Germany 1–30 /30–46 50/30 6.9
Ireland, Greece, 
Spain, Austria
– – – 150 100
France 52 25 20 – –
Croatia 20 34 10 – –








– – – 150 5
Lithuania 30 50 15 – –
Hungary – – – 150/176 5/100
Poland 0–3/3–30 0/41 8 150 100
Romania 0–5/5–30 5.45 5 – –
UK
NI/EN – – – 150/150 100/5
SC – – – 150/600 5/100
WA 54 128 – 150/200/250/300
15/30/
55/100
Notes: WL: Wallonia, FL: Flanders, NI: Northern Ireland, EN: England, SC: Scotland, WA: Wales
Source: European Commission
The 2018 Commission proposal for CAP for the period 2021–2027 is again relatively 
ambitious in the capping level by decreasing signifi cantly the thresholds for DP reduction 
to large farms compared to both the fi nal agreement on 2013 CAP reform and the initial 
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2011 Commission proposal. That is, this proposal aims to reduce DPs by 25% starting 
already at EUR 60,000 threshold per farm compared to the EUR 150,000 threshold and 
20% reduction rate considered in the 2011 Commission proposal. The capping (i.e., 100%
cut) is proposed from the EUR 100,000 threshold compared to EUR 300,000 threshold 
considered in the 2011 Commission proposal (Table 1). Similar to the 2013 CAP 
reform, the 2018 Commission proposal allows subtracting labour costs from DPs to cal- 
culate the thresholds for DP reduction. The payments obtained from the application 
of the reduction of DPs are primarily proposed to be used to contribute to the fi nancing 
of the redistributive payment.
3. Farm Structure and Distribution of DPs in Slovakia
Farm structure in Slovakia is strongly dominated by corporate farms (joint stock companies, 
cooperatives and limited liability companies), which are generally quite large. In 2016, 
their average size was 519 ha per farm and they accounted for around 15% of all farms but 
used around 80% of the total utilized agricultural land (UAA). In contrast, the average size 
of (small) family farms is 56 hectares and they use only around 16% of UAA (Table 3).
Table 3: Farm structure in Slovakia in 2016
Average farm size 
(ha per farm)




Corporate farms 519 15.2 80.0
  Cooperatives 1,193 2.9 35.4
  Limited liability companies 320 11.6 37.8
  Joint-stock companies 1,042 0.6 6.8
Family farms 56 28.6 16.1
Non-business, individuals 6 55.1 3.1
Others 61 1.1 0.7
Total 99 100 100
Source: Agricultural Paying Agency of Slovakia 
The dominance of large farms in Slovakia largely determines the distribution of DPs 
between farms. This is because the main bulk of DPs are granted in form of decoupled 
payments – the Single Area Payment Scheme (SAPS). The SAPS is a fl at rate area-based 
payment which implies that the total DP per farm are proportional to the total land used 
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by the farm. This causes that DPs are highly unequally distributed in Slovakia towards 
few large benefi ciaries. As much as 25% of total DPs (i.e., EUR 104.3 million) allocated 
in Slovakia in 2016 were paid to farms which receive more than EUR 500 thousand per 
farm. These farms received on average EUR 740,880 per farm in 2016. Around 22% 
of total DPs (EUR 94.1 million) received DPs between 300 and EUR 500 thousand 
or on average EUR 387,259 per farm. As much as 76% of DPs were granted to 1,096 
farms (5.8% of all farms) which received more than EUR 100 thousand per farm. While 
the remaining 17 798 small and medium size farms (94% of all farms) received only 24% 
of DPs (Figure 1). These fi gures suggest that the introduction of measures reducing DPs 
to large farms (e.g., as in the 2018 Commission proposal) could affect a large share of DPs 
in Slovakia.
Figure 1: Distribution of DPs by beneficiary size in Slovakia in 2017 
Note: The abbreviation K refers to EUR 1,000.
Source: European Commission, Statistical Factsheet 2018
Compared to other MS, Slovakia has the most unequal distribution of DPs in the EU. 
The top 20 percent largest benefi ciaries in Slovakia receive 94% of total DPs (Figure 2). 
In Czechia, which also is dominated by large farms, this fi gure is 89% of total DPs, while 
in MS such as Austria, Finland and the Netherlands, which are dominated by small farms, 
it is less than 60%. On average in the EU, the top 20 percent largest benefi ciaries receive 
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Figure 2: Share of DPs received by 20% biggest beneficiaries by MS, 2015 (in %)
Source: EC (2017)
4. Capping scenarios and data
We simulate four scenarios to investigate the potential impact of different options for cap- 
ping and degressivity on DP distribution in Slovakia (Table 4).
 Capping at EUR 60,000 (referred to as “Capping at EUR 60K”)
 Capping at EUR 100,000 (referred to as “Capping at EUR 100K”)
 Capping at EUR 150,000 (referred to as “Capping at EUR 150K”)
 2018 Commission proposal (referred to as “2018 EC proposal”)
We consider all types of DPs granted to farms in Slovakia in these scenarios. The fi rst 
three scenarios assume a 100% reduction of DPs for EUR 60,000, EUR 100,000 and 
at EUR 150,000 thresholds per farm, respectively. The last scenario simulates the 2018 
Commission proposal (Table 4). For all four scenarios we consider simulations with and 
without subtracted labour costs from DPs before applying degressivity/capping.
The choice of the scenarios is based on the political discussions underpinning 
the CAP for the period 2020–2027 (Matthews, 2018a,b; EC, 2018b). Alongside the 2018 
Commission proposal, we consider both less stringent capping (i.e., capping at EUR 100K 
and capping at EUR 150K) and more stringent capping (i.e., capping at EUR 60K). The aim 
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Note that all four scenarios impose a stronger capping than both the 2011 Commission 
proposal and the 2013 CAP reform agreement.











60,000–75,000 100 – – 25
75,000–90,000 100 – – 50
90,000–100,000 100 – – 75
100,000–150,000 100 100 – 100
More than 150,000 100 100 100 100
To simulate the impacts of the scenarios, we use commercial farm database for Slovakia 
for 2017 available from the Slovak Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (referred 
to as Ministry of Agriculture). The farm database is a system of data collection that takes 
place each year and collects detailed accountancy data for commercial farms. The database 
covers large commercial farms (around 1,500 farms) in Slovakia.1 The sample size is rela- 
tively sizable compared to total agricultural area in Slovakia. The sample of 1,500 farms 
(8% of all benefi ciaries) used in this paper covers around 80% of agricultural area which is 
approximately equal to the total area commercial farms use in Slovakia (Table 3).
5. Simulation approach
The reduction of DPs to large farms (i.e., degressivity, capping, redistributive payment) 
targets the subsidy level at farm level with the aim of reducing the payment size. 
The extent to what a particular farm is subject to these measures depends largely on farms 
specifi c characteristics particularly on its size (total land use, labour costs etc.) which 
requires the application of a micro approach. There is grooving body of literature using 
(partial equilibrium) micro simulation approach to study the impacts of CAP reforms 
such as the impact of farms specifi c environmental measures introduced by the 2013 
CAP reform (e.g., Vanni and Cardillo, 2013; Solazzo et al., 2014; Vosough-Ahmadi et al.,
2015; Louhichi et al., 2018) or the impact of changes introduced to farm specifi c 
DPs by the past reforms (e.g., Espinosa et al., 2020). Most of these micro simulation 
1 The database does not include individual farms which are usually small with 56 ha average farm 
size and use approximately 16% of agricultural area in Slovakia (Table 3). However, small farms 
are not affected by capping and hence they do not affect the simulated results.
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approaches are based either on individual (real) farms (e.g., Buysse et al., 2007; Solazzo and 
Pierangeli, 2016; Louhichi et al., 2018) or on representative (average) farms (e.g., Gocht and 
Britz, 2011; Louhichi et al., 2010). Although the representative farm simulation approach 
can capture certain extent the farm-specifi c policies (e.g., DP diversity), they are subject 
to some limitations. They cannot model policies for which implementation of a measure 
depends on individual farm characteristics as they are subject to signifi cant aggregation bias 
(Louhichi et al., 2017).
In this paper we apply the micro simulation approach based on individual (real) farms 
(e.g., similar to Vanni and Cardillo, 2013). We simulate the scenarios mentioned above 
for all the individual farms available in the commercial farm database for Slovakia for 2017. 
The simulation of the capping scenarios assumes fi xed farm structure. We adjust only the value 
of DPs to all the farms in the database; the other variables (e.g., land allocation, production, 
prices) are kept fi xed. Given that most of DPs are granted in the form of SAPS which is 
decoupled from production, they are not expected to signifi cantly impact the production 
or land allocation between crops. The impact of SAPS (and hence also of capping scenarios) 
might have some production effects only in the presence of credit constraint and through its 
link to land by impacting land prices and total farm land use (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009; 
O’Donoghue and Whitaker, 2010; Ciaian et al., 2012). However, these two effects as such 
are not expected to signifi cantly impact results simulated in this paper. In general, the impact 
of decoupled DPs on production are found in the literature to be relatively small and some 
studies even fi nd negative effects (e.g., Goodwin and Mishra, 2006; Rizov et al., 2013; 
Kazukauskas et al., 2014), whereas the land allocation impacts are expected to be constrained 
due to the presence of relatively high transaction costs in the land markets in Slovakia.2
6. Results
Table 5 reports impacts of the simulated scenarios on the affected DPs by capping. 
The simulated results show that when labour costs are not deducted, the most strict policy 
option in terms of the affected DPs is the capping at EUR 60K. This is expected as this 
scenario imposes the lowest threshold for capping. That is, under the capping at EUR 60K,
large commercial farms would lose annually around EUR 208.4 million DPs per year 
which represents 75% of total DPs. As expected, the simulated DP losses for large farms 
decrease with the capping level. They reduce to EUR 174.8 million (63% of total DPs) 
2 The land owners face significant transaction costs in Slovakia if they want to withdraw their land 
from the corporate farms and relocate it (e.g., bargaining costs with farm management, costs 
of dealing with inheritance and co-owners). The transaction costs limit adjustments of farm 
structure, farm land use and in general the functioning of land market (Ciaian et al. 2009, Ciaian 
and Swinnen, 2006).
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and EUR 141.5 million (51%) for the capping at EUR 100K and EUR 150K, respectively. 
The annual DP losses of large farms for the 2018 Commission proposal are at EUR 190.1 
million (68% of total DPs). They are close but lower than in the scenario assuming capping 
at EUR 60K. This is because under the 2018 Commission proposal DPs are gradually 
reduced starting at EUR 60K and capping is implemented only at EUR 100K, whereas 
for the latter scenario the capping is at a lower rate at EUR 60K. These results suggest 
that the capped DPs are relatively large amounts representing more than 50% of the total 
DPs implying that such CAP changes as considered in the four scenarios are likely to be 
politically infeasible to be accepted from the perspective of large farms’ interest groups.
As expected, when labour costs are taken into account the DP losses for large farms 
are signifi cantly reduced (by a factor greater than 13) due to capping. They reduce to EUR 
15.4 million (5.5% of total DPs), EUR 9.7 million (3.5%) and EUR 5.8 million (2.1%) 
for the capping at EUR 60K, EUR 100K and EUR 150K, respectively. For the 2018 Com- 
mission proposal, DP losses to large farms represent EUR 12.2 million (4.4% of total DPs)
(Table 5). As a result, this option appears to be politically more acceptable from the per- 
spective of large farms than the option without the deduction of labour costs.
Table 5: Simulated effects of capping of DPs in Slovakia
Labour costs are not deducted 
before applying capping




















Capped farms 931 753 586 931 203 105 62 203




59 48 37 59 13 7 4 13
Capped amount
(million EUR /year)
208.4 174.8 141.5 190.1 15.4 9.7 5.8 12.2
Capped amount 
in total DPs (%)




6 11  16 9 55 56 56 55
Notes: EUR 60K: Capping at EUR 60,000; EUR 100K: Capping at EUR 100,000; EUR 150K: Capping at EUR 
150,000; 2018 EC: the 2018 Commission proposal.
Source: MPRV (2017), own calculations
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Figure 3: The distribution of capped DPs per farm across sampled farms for all four 
scenarios when labour costs a re not deducted
Source: MPRV (2016), own calculations.
Figure 4: The distribution of capped DPs per farm across sampled farms for all four 
scenarios when labour costs are deducted
Source: MPRV (2016), own calculations.
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As expected, the share of commercial farms affected by the capping is negatively 
correlated with the capping level and varies between 37% (or 586 farms) and 59% (931) 
of all sampled farms. The share of farms affected by capping signifi cantly decreases 
when labour costs are taken into account to between 4% (62 farms) and 13% (203) 
of all sampled farms. In contrast, the share of DPs received by the top 20 percent largest 
sampled benefi ciaries is positively correlated with the capping level while this share is 
signifi cantly lower when labour costs are not deducted. It varies between 6% and 16% 
when labour costs are not deducted and between 55% and 56% when labour costs are 
deducted (Table 5).
Figure 3 and Figure 4 depict the distribution of capped DPs with and without con- 
sidering labour costs deductions for the four simulated scenarios. When labour costs 
are not deducted, most capped farms loose annually DPs in the amount between EUR 0
and EUR 50K representing around 14%, 11%, 7% and 18% of the sampled farms 
for the capping at EUR 60K, at EUR 100K, at EUR 150K and the 2018 EC proposal, 
respectively (Figure 3). This is followed by the DP losses between EUR 50K and 
EUR 100K varying between 6% and 9% of the sampled farms across the four simulated 
scenarios. For the rest of DP losses considered in Figure 3, the share of capped farms 
is less than 7% of the sampled farms. More than EUR 200K DPs per farm loose as 
many as 24%, 20%, 16% and 22% of the sampled farms for the capping at EUR 60K, 
at EUR 100K, at EUR 150K and the 2018 EC proposal, respectively. There is also 
a signifi cant share of farms losing DPs from capping by more than EUR 500K (between 
4% and 6% of the sampled farms). These are huge sums of DPs per farm and impact 
relatively many farms suggesting that a strong opposition from these farms is expected 
if such policy options are proposed or approved.
When labour costs are deducted, the vast majority of capped farms (between 3.3% 
and 11.5% of the sampled farms across all the scenarios) loose annually DPs less than 
EUR 150K per farm. Only a small share of farms loose more than EUR 200K DPs 
per farm (less than 1.1% of the sampled farms across all the scenarios) or more than 
EUR 500K DPs per farm (less than 0.2% of the sampled farms across all the scenarios) 
when labour costs are deducted (Figure 4). These fi gures are also sizable for some farms 
but signifi cantly fewer farms are affected compared to the situation when labour costs 
are not deducted. 
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Table 6: Difference in the performance of capped and not capped farms
Labour costs are not deducted 
before applying capping




















Capped 60 60 59 60 73 73 74 73
Not capped 72 72 73 72 60 60 61 60
Production 
in EUR per ha
Capped 1,752 1,730 1,758 1,752 1,164 1,227 1,297 1,164
Not capped 1,875 1,950 1,781 1,875 1,902 1,845 1,808 1,902
Ratio 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.6
Employment 
per 100 ha
Capped 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.1
Not capped 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.7
Ratio 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 2.5 2.6 2.9 2.5
Profits per EUR 
of DPs
Capped 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4
Not capped 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6




Capped 1,621 1,855 2,240 1,621 981 1,384 1,499 981
Not capped 280 355 380 280 1,085 1,049 1,054 1,085




Capped 3,420 3,917 4,651 3,420 2,429 3,536 4,080 2,429
Not capped 589 747 847 589 2,236 2,170 2,186 2,236




Capped 2,051 2,366 2,822 2,051 1,200 1,764 2,108 1,200
Not capped 233 339 410 233 1,322 1,274 1,274 1,322





Capped 162 184 214 162 113 170 206 113
Not capped 16.0 26.4 34.0 16.0 97.9 94.5 95.0 97.9




Capped 44 51 58 44 12 18 21 12
Not capped 1.5 4.8 8.1 1.5 29 27 27 29




Capped 1,156 1,357 1,603 1,156 1,038 1,458 1,639 1,038
Not capped 86 134 194 86 670 665 680 670
Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.6
Notes: EUR 60K: capping at EUR 60,000; EUR 100K: capping at EUR 100,000; EUR 150K: capping 
at EUR 150,000; 2018 EC: the 2018 Commission proposal; Capped: Capped farms; 
Not capped: Not capped farms; Ratio: Ratio of not capped to capped farms. 
Source: MPRV (2017), own calculations
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As Table 6 shows there are signifi cant differences in performance between affected 
(capped farms) and not affected (non-capped) farms. In general, farms that would be 
affected by capping usually cultivate a much larger area, have higher assets, equity, sales, 
and total profi ts, but have fewer employees as well as lower production per hectare and 
lower profi ts per EUR 1 of DPs compared to farms that would not be affected by capping. 
For example, compared to non-capped farms, capped farms have lower agricultural 
production per hectare (between 1% and 63%), lower employment per 100 hectare 
(between 0% and 190%) and profi ts per EUR 1 of DPs (between 20% and 50%). This is 
valid for both situations when labour costs are deducted or not when calculating capping 
amounts. Further, potentially affected farms by capping have a greater number of owners 
than not affected farms when labour costs are not deducted. However, the reverse is 
valid when labour costs are deducted: former farms have a lower number of owners than 
the latter farms.
In general, non-capped farms specialize in production of more labour-intensive 
commodities like fruits and vegetables and permanent crops, whereas capped farms tend 
to specialise in more capital intensive commodities such as cereals and oilseeds. As Table 
6 shows, capped farms tend to have a lower share of animal production in total production 
than not capped farms when labours costs are not taken into account. The reverse is valid 
for the situation when labour costs are deducted.
7. Political economy context of capping in Slovakia
Given that the objectives of the Slovak agricultural policy is to stimulate agricultural 
productivity growth, agricultural employment, animal production, special plant production 
(e.g., fruits and vegetables) and rural development (MoARD, 2015), the capping of DPs 
might contribute to certain extent in achieving some of these policy objectives or to make 
the policy more effi cient. As shown above, this is because potentially affected farms 
by the capping are those that contribute less to achieving the policy objectives compared 
to not affected farms (e.g., in terms of employment or per hectare productivity).3 The saved 
funds from the capping could be used to enhance the policy priorities such as supporting 
smaller farms, specifi c production sectors or rural development.
On the contrary to these results, the Slovak revelled policy position shows a limited 
or no support for capping of DPs (MoARD 2012). There are three main reasons for this 
position of the Slovak government. The fi rst reason is the productivity argument supported 
3 In other words, without capping many farms receive a substantial share of DPs but contribute 
less to employment and productivity. When removing a part of DPs through the capping, 
the potentially affected farms are those with lower performance implying a potential improvement 
in the efficiency of the Slovak agricultural policy.
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by the fact that the productivity of farms might partially depend on DPs. The conceptual 
and empirical literature supporting this view is primarily linked to the imperfect credit 
access widely argued to be valid for the agricultural sector (e.g., Janda, 2003; Blancard 
et al., 2006; Ciaian and Swinnen 2009; Huttel et al., 2010; Curtiss et al., 2012). DPs may 
alleviate farm credit constraint (especially SAPS which is decoupled from production) 
by directly providing access to liquidity or indirectly by increasing farms’ credit worthiness 
or their use as collateral (Ciaian and Swinnen 2009; Latruffe et al., 2010; O’Donoghue and 
Whitaker, 2010; Ciaian et al., 2012). This ultimately may lead to a positive relationship 
between farm productivity and DPs. However, the application of capping reduces DP 
to large farms and thus could lead to a reduction of the overall farm productivity. This 
effect is expected to be stronger for small farms which are expected to have more diffi cult 
access to capital than large farms (e.g., Petrick 2004; Sarris et al. 2004). However, large 
farms could also be affected to a certain extent.
The second reason is the political economy argument linked to the lobby pressure 
from the interest groups (Becker, 1983; Swinnen 2015). The previous section showed 
that (would-be capped) large farms could lose signifi cant amount of money from capping 
which provides them a strong incentive for lobbying for the implementation of the CAP 
in a manner which maximizes their gains (Table 5). In comparison to other interest groups 
(e.g., tax payers, consumers, environmental groups, small farms), they are relatively 
small in numbers and thus have relatively low coordination and communication costs 
and can more effectively control the free riding problem. In contrast, small farms are less 
effective in lobbing and thus affect to a lesser extent the CAP implementation because 
they face higher coordination and communication costs due to their large population 
size, geographic dispersion, lower economic relevance4 and they face greater free riding 
problem. Regarding other interest groups, they are not always affected (e.g., taxpayers) 
because usually capping implies only redistribution of the support between benefi ciaries 
within the agricultural sector or relocation of support to other CAP policy instruments and 
does not necessarily leads to CAP budget reduction (which may ultimately reduce taxes). 
Only environmental groups might be concerned as they may pressure for funds obtained 
from capping to be used for environmental purposes. However, environmental groups are 
relatively weak and not very active in Slovakia.
Finally, the third reason of Slovakia’s position against capping is the argument 
related to the low economic distortions induced by DPs. As mentioned in previous 
sections, most DPs are granted in the form of SAPS which are decoupled from production. 
4 They are smaller in terms of their size (56 ha per farm as compared to 519 ha per farm 
for corporate farms) and in terms of the amount of land they control (16% of UAA as compared 
to 80% of UAA for corporate farms) (Table 3).
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As a result, SAPS payments create low deadweight costs as they are lump sum transfers.5 
They, however, create deadweight costs in taxation. However, Slovakia is a net benefi ciary 
of the CAP and a large share of DPs in Slovakia are fi nanced by foreign taxpayers rather 
than Slovak taxpayers implying a limited opposition against CAP from this interest 
group.6 This situation generates rather low opposition from domestic taxpayers against 
DPs or how they are distributed among farms.
It seems that the above political pressures were materialised with regards to the fi nal 
agreement of the 2013 CAP reform. The opposition to the more ambitious initial proposal 
of the Commission from 2011 (Table 1) was “successful” as the interest of large farms 
were accommodated in the adopted less ambitious fi nal agreement on the 2013 CAP 
reform (MoARD 2012). That is, the fi nal agreement gave fl exibility to MS in choosing 
how they want to implement capping. MS could opt for degressivity of a minimum of 5% 
above the EUR 150,000 threshold. Higher rates of degressivity could be applied by MS 
(up to 100%) but this was made optional. Further, instead of degressivity and capping 
MS could use a redistributive payment which aims to transfer support from large farms 
to small farms. Ultimately, Slovakia’s choice on the implementation of the 2013 CAP 
reform refl ects the preferences of large farmers. Slovakia decided to apply the minimum 
degressivity (i.e., 5% above the EUR 150,000 threshold) and no capping of DPs, while 
the redistributive payment was not applied. Although small farmers could have benefi ted 
from the redistributive payment, they were unable to affect the fi nal decision reached 
by the Ministry to introduce this payment.
The current position against capping is expected to be maintained also in the future 
in Slovakia; particularly with respect to the negotiation of the CAP for the period 
2021–2027. There are not observed underlying developments that would change 
the status-quo. In fact, the offi cial position of the Slovak government on the 2018 Com- 
mission proposal for the CAP for 2021–2027 states that Slovakia does not support 
capping of DPs and that the redistributive payments should be exempt from capping. 
Slovak government called for the voluntary capping and MS specifi c capping by taking 
in consideration the structure of the farming sector across EU (MoARD 2018; Slovak 
Spectator 2018). Similar position on the 2018 Commission proposal is represented 
by the Slovak Chamber of Agriculture and Food who reject mandatory capping and 
degressivity of DPs (Štefček 2018).
5 In contrast, as argued above, DPs might lead to agricultural productivity increase. 
6 This is reinforced by the fact that when a country is a net beneficiary of the CAP, politically 
optimal level of support is greater when the country is within the CAP as compared to a situation 
when the country would be outside the CAP (e.g., outside EU) with agricultural policy fully 
funded from the national sources (Pokrivcak et al. 2001).
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8. Conclusions
Direct payments are a main support instrument applied within the CAP. Since its intro-
duction there were several attempts to reduce DPs to large farms based on the ground 
that they are unnecessary given that these farms are able to generate suffi cient income. 
Moreover, many voters often perceive unfair granting DPs to large farms in favour 
of their transfer to better uses such as for rural development and/or the provision of public 
goods. On the other hand, Member States with dominant large farms strongly oppose 
the reduction of DPs to large farms. This is particularly the case of Slovakia, where large 
farms dominate the farm structure representing around 80% of the total land use.
The objective of this paper is to analyse the implications of DP capping for Slovakia 
as well as to discusses the political economy background explaining the political 
preferences in Slovakia in the context of the ongoing discussions and negations about 
the CAP for the period 2020–2027. The analyses are based on the micro simulations 
aiming to estimate the affected DP amounts under different scenarios of DP capping using 
the commercial farm database from Slovakia for 2017. Four scenarios are simulated (with 
and without subtracted labour costs): (i) capping at EUR 60,000, (ii) capping at EUR 
100,000, (iii) capping at EUR 150,000 and (iv) the 2018 Commission proposal.
The simulation results show that the capped DPs, which are estimated potential losses 
to large farms, are relatively signifi cant amounts when labour costs are not subtracted 
representing more than 50% of the total DPs in Slovakia. Annually they vary between 
EUR 208.4 million and EUR 141.5 million across the simulated scenarios. The annual 
DP losses to large farms, if the 2018 Commission proposal would be approved, are 
at EUR 190.1 million (68% of total DPs). Up to between 16% and 24% of the sampled 
commercial farms would lose more than EUR 200K DPs per farm across the simulated 
four scenarios. Also a signifi cant share of farms (between 4% and 6% of the sampled 
farms) would lose DPs from capping by more than EUR 500K per farm.
However, when the labour costs are subtracted the capped DPs are signifi cantly 
reduced by a factor greater than 13. They reduce to between EUR 5.8 million and 
EUR 15.4 million (between 2.1% and 5.5% of total DPs). Under the 2018 Commission 
proposal the losses to large farms would be at EUR 12.2 million (4.4% of total DPs). With 
the labour costs subtracted, only a small share of farms would lose more than EUR 200K 
DPs per farm (less than 1.1% of the sampled farms across all the scenarios) or more than 
EUR 500K DPs per farm (less than 0.2% of the sampled farms across all the scenarios).
From a policy effi ciency point of view it might be rational to reduce DPs to large farms 
because potentially affected large farms in Slovakia show lower performance and lower 
contributions to the agricultural policy objectives compared to unaffected farms by the DP 
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capping. For example, the potentially affected large farms have fewer employees, lower 
profi ts, and lower production per hectare than unaffected farms. 
However, contrary to this evidence, Slovakia is strongly opposed to reduction of DPs 
to large farms. There are three main reasons for this position of Slovakia: the productivity 
argument, the political economy argument linked to the lobby pressure from large farms 
and low economic distortions caused by DPs.
The fi rst productivity argument is link to the evidence that there might be a positive 
relationship between farm productivity and DPs through credit channel by alleviating 
credit constraint in the agricultural sector. Since the capping reduces DP to large farms, 
it could lead to reduction of the overall farm productivity. Second, large farms are poli-
tically better organised and have relatively low coordination and communication costs 
compared to other interest groups (e.g., tax payers, consumers, environmental groups, 
small farms) which makes them an effective interest group able to infl uence the Slovak 
government position on capping in their favour. Finally, most DPs are granted in the form 
of support decoupled from production. This implies that DPs create low deadweight costs 
as they are lump sum transfers, while Slovakia is a net benefi ciary of the CAP (and DPs) 
thus infl icting relatively low costs on Slovak taxpayers.
It seems that this political-economic preference of Slovakia was already materialised 
in the past particularly with respect to the fi nal agreement of the 2013 CAP reform. 
The opposition to the more ambitious initial proposal of the Commission from 2011 was 
signifi cantly watered down by adopting lower capping rates and providing fl exibility 
to MS in choosing how they want to implement it. This position against capping is 
expected to be maintained also for the future CAP reforms in Slovakia; particularly 
with respect to the negotiation of the CAP for the period 2021–2027. As a result, similar 
to the 2013 CAP reform, the relatively ambitious 2018 Commission proposal is expected 
to be signifi cantly adjusted downward with respect to capping. This could be done either 
by reducing capping rates (including allowing deduction of labour costs from DPs) 
and/or by allowing fl exibly of its implementation across MS.
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